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"This is your secret admirer. All the kids from yesterday and today better not
get in trouble and go to the office. 'Cause if they do go to the office, the kids or
anybody, your husband is gonna be dead meat and I swear to God this is true.
I'll give you a clue, I'm in your second hour. I know your husband. He will not
live very long if you do not do what I say. Thank you for your attention."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court uttered
the now famous words "that [n]either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse gate."3 Since that time,
countless laws and court decisions have entered the hallowed hall-
ways, creating a plethora of potential liabilities, legal rights, and man-
agement responsibilities for school officials. One of the more recent
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1. PPOs are restraining orders. They exist in almost all states, and emanate from
statutes prohibiting "harassment," "domestic-abuse," or "stalking." See, e.g.,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Reissue 1998); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-311.09 (Cum.
Supp. 1998).
2. Spielman v. Hayes, 3 P.3d 711, 712-13 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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legal issues to muddle the principal's desk is responding to various
types of protective restraining orders.4 These orders, referred to by
many as Personal Protection Orders or "PPOs," are issued to victims
of abuse, harassment or threatening conduct, and typically restrict
contact or communication between two individuals. Presently, PPOs
can be obtained with relative ease and in many cases are issued ex
parte. There are many official court web sites explaining everything
you need to know about PPOs, with some even suggesting that "[tihe
law has been designed so you can get [a protective order] without a
lawyer by filing the forms yourself."5 In the school setting, PPOs may
be issued between co-workers, classmates, parents, board members or
visitors. In fact, they have become so popular that even school dis-
tricts as entities consider them an option for handling unruly
conduct. 6
The student's message that begins this article is illustrative of
PPOs at school. It was left on a teacher's voice mail at school causing
her substantial emotional distress. As a result, she petitioned the
court and obtained a PPO ensuring that the harassing student "stay
away from... [her] at all times."7 The school's response was to imme-
diately expel the student, eliminating any chance of contact at school.
In many states, however, expulsion or reassigning the student to an-
other class may not be a response option, if the conduct occurs off
school grounds.S In smaller districts, even when the conduct occurs on
school grounds, reassignment may not be an option, because there
4. See Anand Vaishnav & Doreen Iudica Vigue, Restraining Orders Illustrate
Greater Focus on School Safety, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2000, at B1 (stating "the
idea of students obtaining restraining orders against classmates - and the chal-
lenge school administrators face in enforcing them - raises new ques-
tions.... .")[hereinafter Restraining Orders]; Difficult Parents - Take Six Steps to
Deal with Parent's Restraining Order, SCHOOL Poi.'Y LEGAL INSIDER, July 1998, at
7.
5. Ramsey County Courts - Domastic [sic] Abuse Court: On Harassment Re-
straining (HRO) (visited Oct. 13, 2000) <http://www.courts.state.mn.us/districts/
secondramsey hro.htm>; see also King County District Court: Anti-Harass-
ment (visited Oct. 13, 2000) <http:/www.metrokc.gov/kcdc/ahinfo.htm>; Fourth
Judicial District Court: Harassment Restraining Order (visited Oct. 13, 2000)
<http-//www.co.hennepin.mn.us/courts/family/da/daharass.htm>.
6. See, e.g., Lathrop & Clark, Harassment Injunctions, Wis. ScH. NEws, April 1998,
at 27 (suggesting schools themselves consider securing protective orders to deal
with unruly students, parents, or visitors); Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske,
565 N.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)(stating that reference to "persons"
in harassment injunction law includes municipalities within its scope).
7. Spielman, 3 P.3d at 713.
8. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-267 (Reissue 1996)(allowing discipline by long-
term suspension, expulsion, or mandatory reassignment only when the conduct
"occurs on school grounds . . . or at a school-sponsored activity or athletic
event.... ."). For limitations on discipline or reassignment of employees, see NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 79-824-79-842 (Reissue 1996). See also M. Chester Nolte, Ed.D.,
Establishing The Nexus: A School Board Primer, 38 EDuC. L. REP. 1 (1987).
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may be only one building or class. In addition, it is likely the PPO
may last longer than the school's maximum permissible disciplinary
sanction.9 In these latter circumstances, schools face the ultimate
challenge of how to properly respond when presented with PPOs, be-
cause some contact in school hallways, restrooms, lunchrooms, play-
grounds, or assemblies is inevitable. This article will examine the
growing problem of dealing with PPOs in the public school context.
II. THE PPO PHENOMENON
Beginning in the early 1990s, triggered by a number of school-asso-
ciated deaths and other serious crimes at school, much focus turned to
issues involving school violence and classroom safety.1O For example,
Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act of 199411 and the Safe and
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994.12 By the year 2000,
almost every state had enacted new legislation to address some aspect
of school safety.13 The Nebraska Department of Education now de-
votes an entire section of its internet web page to Safe and Drug-Free
Schools,14 and that web page has links to Nebraska's school accredita-
tion regulations, which require all school systems to adopt safety and
security plans and procedures.15
Despite a decade of regulatory activity and the many pronounce-
ments that schools remain safe places, concern for personal safety lin-
gers.16 This continued anxiety is undoubtedly one factor fueling the
9. The protection order in Spielman was "continuous until modified or rescinded." 3
P.3d at 714. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924(3) (Reissue 1998)(stating that
domestic orders are effective "for a period of one year... unless otherwise modi-
fied by the court"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.09(4) (Cum. Supp. 1998)(limiting
duration of harassment orders to "a period of one year unless otherwise modified
by the court"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-283(2) (Reissue 1996)(limiting expulsions to
"the remainder of the semester").
10. See generally Richard A. Schwartz, Balancing Student Safety and Students'
Rights, 2000 SCH. L. IN REV. 1-1. Violence and safety issues are societal and cer-
tainly not limited to youth or school systems. See id.
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 8921-8923 (1994).
12. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7107-7104, 7111-7118, 7131-7133, 7141-7143 (1994).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REPORT OF STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GuN-FREE
SCHOOLS ACT: SCHOOL YEAR 1997-8 (1999); OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQ. PRE-
VENTION, U.S. DEP'IT OF JUST., 1999 NATL REPORT (1999).
14. Nebraska Department of Education (visited Oct. 13, 2000) <http'//www.nde.state.
ne.us>.
15. See NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. tit. 92, chap. 10 § 004.01B2 (requiring each school
system to have a "safety and security plan" approved by the board); § 004.01B3
(mandating a "safety and security committee" to include faculty, parents, and so
on); § 004.01B4 (requiring the plan to be reviewed annually by persons who are
not school employees or members of the committee).
16. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON SCHOOL SAFETY (1999); Re-
straining Orders, supra note 4, at B1 ("[tihe family felt compelled to ask [the
court] for a restraining order [against her classmate] because the school hadn't
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PPO phenomenon. Another is reflected by victim perceptions. A re-
cent U.S. Department of Justice study "reports that victims perceive
protection orders as effective tools to stop or reduce domestic violence
or stalking ... ."17 In addition, many professionals are suggesting
PPOs as a viable response to harassing behavior. For example, the
Washington Education Association advises its members that an option
"to counteract student violence against school employees is to file an
anti-harassment injunction keeping the student (or parent who is
harassing an employee) from any contact with the employee." 18
These factors, along with liberal changes in statutory require-
ments, have prompted more teachers, students and parents to seek
PPOs as a personal security measure or self-help safety remedy. In
fact, some authors feel many state PPO laws have gone too far, claim-
ing they were "intended to serve as a shield for victims, [but] are being
misused as a sword by overzealous courts and unscrupulous pseudo-
victims."19 Others argue these new state restraining-order laws vio-
late civil rights. 20
III. PPO LAWS
As background, PPOs are analogous to injunctions. They are tran-
sitory, in that when one expires there is no prohibition against refiling
for another.21 They undoubtedly had their genesis in the "peace bond"
or what some called "peace warrant" law and are grounded in the pub-
lic policy notion that "preventive justice is preferable to punitive jus-
tice."2 2 At common law, a person in fear of harm or injury to person or
property could petition courts of competent jurisdiction and require
another to post a peace bond, typically conditioned that such person
done enough to ensure the girl's safety"); see also Mary Ellen O'Toole, Ph.D, The
School Shooter: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE (visited Nov. 14,
2000) <httpI//www. fbi.gov/library/schoolIschool2.pdff>.
17. Office of Justice Programs News, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1.4 Million Stalking Vic-
tims Annually; Justice Department Reports Latest Findings Regarding Stalking
(visited Nov. 14, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/vawo/press/vawnovl397.htm>.
18. Washington Education Association Online, Introduction: Violence in Our Schools
(visited Nov. 14, 2000) <http/www.wa.nea.orgfpublicatLegal/prvntsv2.htm>.
19. Cathy Young, Protection Orders May Go Too Far, Violate Civil Rights (visited
Nov. 14, 2000) <http//detnews.com/editpage/9909/29/younghtm>.
20. See Callie Anderson Marks, Note, The Kansas Stalking Law: A "Credible Threat"
to Victims. A Critique of the Kansas Stalking Law and Proposed Legislation, 36
WASHBUN L.J. 468 (1997).
21. See Lockenour v. Sculley, 8 Neb. App. 254, 255-57, 592 N.W.2d 161, 162-63
(1999).
22. EDWARD COLE FISHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDIC-
TION IN NEBRASKA 972 (Vol. 1 1950).
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would keep the peace and be of good behavior toward the person
complaining.23
In Nebraska, the "Protection from Domestic Abuse Act" provides a
domestic protection order. 24 In 1998, the Nebraska legislature joined
many other states and enacted a statute creating the "harassment
protection order."25 That statute, in pertinent part, provides:
Any victim who has been harassed as defined by section 28-311.0226 may file
a petition and affidavit for a harassment protection order.... Upon the filing
of such a petition and affidavit in support thereof, the judge or court may issue
a harassment protection order without bond enjoining the respondent from (a)
imposing any restraint upon the person or liberty of the petitioner, (b) harass-
ing, threatening, assaulting, molesting, attacking, or otherwise disturbing the
peace of the petitioner, or (c) telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communi-
cating with the petitioner .... 2 7
The Nebraska Supreme Court Administrator has adopted standard
forms and orders to implement these laws.2 8 PPOs may be issued ex
parte and can last for up to one year. Violating a PPO is cause for
arrest and a Class II misdemeanor. 29
IV. SPEILMANV AND ITS KINDRED
To date, few appellate decisions can be found outlining school re-
sponsibilities when presented with PPOs. They do, however, identify
the many circumstances in which schools might be forced to deal with
protective order matters. The most common of these circumstances is
PPO's between divorced or separated parents. In Mak v. Mak,30 for
23. See id; see generally BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1223 (6th ed. 1990)(defining protec-
tion order as an "[o]rder issued by court in domestic violence or abuse cases to, for
example, protect spouse from physical harm by other spouse or child from abuse
by parent(s). Such order may be granted immediately by court in cases where
immediate and present danger of violence or abuse is shown. Such emergency
orders are granted in ex parte type proceeding and are temporary in duration
pending full hearing by court with all involved parties present.").
24. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Reissue 1998).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.09 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
26. The word "harass" is broadly defined to include a "course of conduct directed at a
specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and
which serves no legitimate purpose." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02 (Cum. Supp.
1998). A "course of conduct" includes "a series of acts of following, detaining,
restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person or telephoning, contact-
ing, or otherwise communicating with the person." Id.
27. See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (Reissue 1998)(outlining similar procedure for
the issuance of protection orders).
28. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924.02 (Reissue 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.09(6)
(Cum. Supp. 1998).
29. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-924, 42-928 (Reissue 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
311.09(4) and (9) (Cum. Supp. 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-106 (Cum. Supp.
1998)(stating that a Class II misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum of six
months imprisonment, a one thousand dollar fine, or both).
30. 1999 WL 1052027, at *1 (Neb. Ct. App., Apr. 4, 1999).
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example, the mother obtained a protection order against the father.
School officials were called upon to referee when "during the time the
protection order applied, [the father] pulled the boys out of school
early on a day [the mother] was to pick them up for visitation," and
"[diuring the same time period, he also met the boys after school and
took them home, despite the fact that [the mother] was waiting to pick
them up for visitation."31
Speilman v. Hayes involved a teacher and a student.3 2 Another
case, Baker v. Mason,3 3 involved a secretary and a student. In Baker,
a student at the University of Oklahoma became agitated on more
than one occasion for not gaining access to air his complaints with the
president.3 4 A secretary in the office of the O.U. president, alleging
annoyance, alarm and emotional distress, obtained "a protective order
prohibiting [the student] from contacting [her] at her place of employ-
ment ... and restricting [the student's] contact to O.U.'s legal coun-
sel's office. . . ."35
A third Oklahoma case involved a teacher and board member or co-
worker. In Watts v. Hensley,36 a teacher sought protection against a
school board member who angrily confronted the teacher in the gym-
nasium office after he found his daughter crying. The superintendent
was summoned to intervene. 3 7 The board member "pointed his finger
at [the superintendent] and yelled."38 After the incident, the teacher
attended a board meeting and asked the board member to resign.39
When he did not, she filed for a protective order.4 0 In granting the
protective order, the trial court ordered the board member to "remain
away from [the teacher] wherever she may be at any time."4 ' It is
interesting to note that the board member was also ordered to com-
plete an "anger management course and to enroll in the Oklahoma
State School Board Association's new school board member course."42
31. Id. at *6 (holding that full custody should be awarded to the mother, because the
father's conduct is inflexible and not in the best interests of the boys).
32. See Spielman, 3 P.3d 711 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999).
33. 958 P.2d 808 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 809. The court upheld the issuance of the order. Id. at 810.
36. 4 P.3d 45 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999).
37. See id. at 46.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id. In reversing the trial court's decision, the appellate court reviewed the statu-
tory requirement regarding a "course or pattern of conduct" and found a failure of
proof noting the incident in the gymnasium "was a single event." Id. at 46-47. In
light of the reversal, it was also decided to leave the anger management and new
board member course issues to another day. Id.; see also NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-
924(1)(g) (Reissue 1998)(allowing the court in domestic protection order cases to
20001
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The newest and perhaps most troublesome circumstance is PPOs
between classmates. In Lockenour v. Sculley,43 the Nebraska Court of
Appeals reviewed a protective order between two students, stating:
On April 29, 1998, Connie Lockenhour filed an application and affidavit for a
protection order.., on behalf of her 13-year old son, Andrew Dorothy. The
application was filed against a classmate of Andrew's at Lexington Junior
High School, Joe Sculley....
Lockenhour alleged that on April 28, 1998, Sculley harassed and bullied
Andrew by kicking, hitting, and punching him. She also stated that Sculley
threatened Andrew by sticking a pen in his face. Lockenhour further alleged
that on April 9 or 10, Sculley threatened Andrew with "greater physical
harm...."
On May 1st, 1998, the district court issued an ex parte protection order
against Sculley pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-924 (Reissue 1993), which
was to remain in effect for a period of 1 year from the date of the order.4 4
It is worth noting here that the Lockenour Court addressed the "mi-
nority status" of the harassing student and the necessary procedures
to be followed against any minor, holding:
Although we reverse on the basis that there was no verbatim record, we
briefly touch upon Sculley's argument that the district court erred in entering
a protection order against a minor without appointing a guardian for the suit.
Sculley cites to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-309 (Reissue 1995), which states in part:
"Except as provided by the Nebraska Probate Code, the defense of an infant
must be by a guardian for the suit, who may be appointed by the court in
which the action is prosecuted, or by a judge thereof, or by a county judge."
See Peterson v. Skiles, 173 Neb. 470, 113 N.W.2d 628 (1962). See, also, Omey v.
Stauffer, 174 Neb. 247, 117 N.W.2d 481 (1962)(holding that guardian ad litem
for minor defendant in personal injury action is entitled to allowance of rea-
sonable compensation for services to be taxed as costs). Thus, Sculley's point
that the district court should have appointed a guardian is well taken. 4 5
While these cases serve to illustrate the PPO dilemma public
schools face, they do little to provide substantive guidance on impor-
tant legal questions such as: Why be concerned? Do schools have a
duty to protect? Do schools have a duty to respond and enforce protec-
tion orders?
V. REASONABLE STEPS TO PROTECT
At first blush, it might seem that schools have no responsibility for
enforcing PPOs. After all, it is likely the district was not a party to the
initial proceeding, and general rules would suggest a judgment or de-
cree against a specific person for injunctive relief is usually considered
grant "such other relief deemed necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of
the petitioner and any designated family or household member").
43. 8 Neb. App. 254, 592 N.W.2d 161 (1999).
44. Id. at 255-56, 592 N.W.2d at 162-63.
45. Id. at 259-60, 592 N.W.2d at 165.
[Vol. 79:828
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"in personam" or binding only the persons who are parties to the in-
junction action.46
A nonparty argument, however, would not seem prudent as courts
under many circumstances have also held that an injunction may bind
nonparties who are in privity or who have notice or knowledge of the
decree. 4 7 For example, in In re Contempt of Liles,48 the Nebraska Su-
preme Court examined the legal status of nonparties to injunctions
stating: "It is clear, and has long been the rule, that one who is in
privity with an enjoined party and also has knowledge of the injunc-
tion, or one who aids and abets the violation of the injunction, is sub-
ject to the contempt powers of the court."49
Accenting the concepts of privity and notice in the PPO context is
the unique function of public schools as acting in loco parentis. A per-
son standing in loco parentis is one who has put himself/herself in the
situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to
the parental relationship without going through the formalities neces-
sary to a legal adoption, and the rights, duties, and liabilities of such
person are the same as those of a lawful parent.5o In Vermillion v.
State,51 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that while at school:
[The principal and teacher have] authority as in loco parentis, to enforce obe-
dience to [their] lawful commands; subordination, civil deportment, respect
for the rights of other pupils, and all obligations inherent in every school sys-
tem constituting the common law of the school which every pupil is presumed
to know. 5 2
These factors would seem to weigh in favor of schools having some
duty or responsibility in protection order cases, even though they were
not parties to the original proceedings.
In addition, premises liability theories must also be considered. In
Tarnaras v. Farmingdale School District,53 a female high school stu-
dent sued the school district, seeking to recover for personal injuries
on the specific theory that the district failed to enforce a protection
order. The Nassau County District Court had issued a protection or-
der directing the student's estranged boyfriend to stay away from the
46. See State ex rel. Long v. Westover, 107 Neb. 593, 186 N.W. 998 (1922)(holding
that injunction is action in personam requiring jurisdiction of the person, either
by proper service or appearance); Boyd v. State, 19 Neb. 128, 26 N.W. 925 (1886)
(stating that injunctions are personal to the party against whom directed).
47. See State ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960); 42 Am.
Jua.2D Injunctions §§ 298-300 (2000).
48. 217 Neb. 414, 349 N.W.2d 377 (1984).
49. Id. at 416, 349 N.W.2d at 378.
50. See In re Estate of Kite, 260 Neb. 135, 615 N.W.2d 481 (2000); Weinand v. Wei-
nand, 260 Neb. 146, 616 N.W.2d 1 (2000); Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22
N.W.2d 560 (1946).
51. 78 Neb 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907).
52. Id. at 111, 110 N.W. 737 (quoting State v. Burton, 45 Wis. 250 (1878)).
53. 264 A.2d 391, 694 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1999).
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Tarnaras family.54 Despite the order, the boyfriend stalked and
harassed her at school and other locations in violation of the order.55
Approximately one month after the order was issued, she was brutally
attacked inside her home after being let out of school.56
The Tarnaras court held that an action for negligence would not lie
against the school district under the circumstances, because the as-
sault was perpetrated in the student's home after conclusion of the
school day and because the district's physical custody and control of
the student and its concomitant duty of care extended only to the
boundaries of school property.5 7 The court did note, however, that
while not an insurer of the safety of its students, "[u]nder appropriate
circumstances a school may be held liable for injuries to students or
teachers under a theory of premises liability. . ."58 This cautionary
message was tied to the concept of a school's negligent supervision of
its premises and its physical custody and control over a child, for
"[wihen that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the
orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to
reassume control over the child's protection, the school's custodial
duty also ceases."59
Likewise, Johnson v. New York City Board of Education6o involved
a school administrator's suit to recover for personal injury. One the-
ory of liability was the school's disregard of a protective order against
a student's father.61 The administrator obtained a PPO against the
parent following an assault at school on January 27, 1995.62 The evi-
dence established that the school and various school officials were
alerted to the existence of the order.6 3 On March 3, 1995, the parent
came to school and picked up his son, who had been injured in his
physical education class.64 The administrator did not see the parent
on March 3rd and did not even learn he was on school property until
March 6th - three days later.6 5
The administrator in Johnson argued that the discovery of the par-
ent in school in violation of the PPO caused her to suffer post-trau-
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 392, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 676 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1998).
61. See id. at 445.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 447.
64. See id. at 447-48.
65. See id. at 448.
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matic stress syndrome, making the school liable.66 Under these
circumstances, the court held:
While defendants may have breached a duty owed to plaintiff, there is no evi-
dence that such breach endangered plaintiffs physical safety or caused her to
fear for her safety. Indeed, plaintiff did not see [the parent] ... and did not
even learn that [the parent] was on school property until ... three days after
the incident. [The parent] arrived at the school to pick up his son, and there is
absolutely no evidence that he intended to harm plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that she was exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm, such
that would support a finding of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 6 7
Recently, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered a premises lia-
bility theory in Sharkey v. Board of Regents. 68 Sharkey did not in-
volve a PPO. It did involve an assault and stabbing incident between
two students.6 9 In reversing and remanding for a new trial on the
issue of liability, the court held that as a matter of law the University
"owes a landowner-invitee duty to its students to take reasonable steps
to protect against foreseeable acts of violence on its campus and the
harm that naturally flows therefrom."70 On the question of foresee-
ability, the court stated:
It is reasonably foreseeable that such harassment could escalate into violence
when the harasser is confronted, even though Clark [the aggressor] had not
displayed prior violent tendencies. We stated in Gans v. Parkview Plaza Part-
nership, 253 Neb. 373, 384, 571 N.W.2d 261, 269 (1997), . . .[Tihe law does
not require precision in foreseeing the exact hazard or consequence which
happens; it is sufficient if what occurs is one of the kinds of consequences
which might reasonably be foreseen." Given Clark's persistent pattern of har-
assment, an escalation into violence is clearly one of the consequences, which
may reasonably be foreseen from such behavior.
7 1
The Sharkey court clearly held, at least in the University context,
that schools owe a landowner-invitee duty to students and presumably
other invitees, which requires them to take "reasonable steps to pro-
tect" as a matter of law.72 The court's concomitant forseeability analy-
sis leaves little doubt that if schools have notice of PPOs and fail to
respond, even though not parties to the earlier proceeding, liability
may follow.7 3
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. 260 Neb. 166, 615 N.W.2d 889 (2000).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 182, 615 N.W.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 181, 615 N.W.2d at 901.
72. Id. at 182, 615 N.W.2d at 902; see also Doe v. Gunny's Limited Partnership, 256
Neb. 653, 659, 593 N.W.2d 284, 290 (1999)(landowner under duty to take precau-
tions to protect against harm, and "to provide a reasonably sufficient number of
servants to afford a reasonable protection").
73. Sharkey would seem to extend the duty to employees or coworkers as well. See
generally Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Employer's Liability to Employee or Agent
for Injury or Death Resulting from Assualt or Criminal Attack by Third Person,
2000]
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VI. CONCLUSION
When presented with PPOs, it is clear that schools must be more
than spectators or passive referees. Even though not parties to the
original PPO proceeding, courts will likely impose an affirmative duty
on schools to take "reasonable steps to protect" the victim. When con-
sidering the reasonableness of steps taken, it must be remembered
that existing circumstances and law confine schools. Despite PPOs,
compulsory education laws require the provision of services. 74 In
many schools, there is no place to reassign the employee or student,
thereby making contact inevitable. If the conduct occurred off school
grounds, there may be no required nexus for removal or other discipli-
nary action. Due to levy lids and spending limitations, school re-
sources for programs, personnel and other security measures are
greatly restricted.75
Nonetheless, PPOs will enter the schoolhouse gate, and school offi-
cials must be prepared to respond. What steps are reasonable will be
decided case by case. The following steps76 are offered as guidelines
for assisting schools in ensuring the measures they take meet this rea-
sonableness standard. They are by no means all inclusive nor will
some be appropriate for all circumstances.
Get copy of the order.
Verify order.
If anyone states they have a PPO, the princi-
pal should ask to see it. A photocopy should
be made and kept in the appropriate school
file. It can be referred to by staff or shown to
the police if needed.
Make sure the PPO is genuine. The order
should be signed and dated by a judge. Call
the issuing court and give the court clerk the
case number listed. Confirm the name of the
case, the expiration date, and the names of
the victim and perpetrator. Or send a copy
to the school attorney to confirm its validity
and to get advice on what it means.
40 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1996)(discussing an employer's potential duty to protect
employees).
74. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201-210 (Reissue 1996).
75. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-3442-3445 (Reissue 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-1029-
1033 (Reissue 1996).
76. Adapted from Difficult Parents - Take Six Steps to Deal with Parent's Restraining
Order, supra note 4, at 7.
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PERSONAL PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Photo and description.
Alert school employees.
Emergency protocols.
Intervention.
Depending on the case, ask for a photograph
and detailed description of the harasser, and
distribute it as appropriate to school person-
nel.
Notify all school building staff and any se-
curity personnel of the PPO. Provide details
and an explanation of its meaning.
Establish with school security personnel and
local law enforcement emergency procedures
and protocols. A close working relationship
with local law enforcement is imperative.
Consider intervening in the PPO proceed-
ings for specific court guidance or direction
on how to respond or accommodate the order
at school. In proper cases, courts might con-
sider including an incidental contact excep-
tion.
In today's violent and litigious society, PPOs in schools are no
longer atypical, and many educators may find themselves in the mid-
dle of personal altercations between employees, students, parents and
others wondering how to respond. It can be said with certainty that
the school scene is now different and far more complex when it comes
to personal security issues. Against this backdrop, the courts, attor-
neys, and educators must become enlightened about the PPO phenom-
enon and the problems it presents in the public school setting and gain
a thorough understanding of the practical, educational, and legal sides
of the issue.
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